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The Abolishment of Contributory Negligence as a
Defense in North Carolina
It is time for North Carolina to abolish contributory negligence as a
defense and adopt a more equitable and just form of fault liability such
as comparative negligence. The defense of contributory negligence in
North Carolina works as an open turnstile for a tortfeasor to escape
liability. Legally, the tortfeasor has only to prove that his claimant was
contributorily negligent to the slightest degree to unload his burden of
liability.
Legal scholars attribute the origin of the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence to the 1809 English case of Butterfield v.
Forrester.' The defendant in Butterfield while making repairs to his
house, left one of the poles being used, protruding into a part of the
roadway. The pole was discernible for about 100 yards down the
roadway and could easily have been avoided. The plaintiff riding vi-
olently on his horse ran into the pole and was injured. The court held
that the plaintiff could not recover any damages because a person has a
duty to use ordinary caution and care for himself. Thus, the common
law adopted the rule that a plaintiff's lack of ordinary care, no matter
how slight, barred recovery if it was the proximate cause of his injury.
Courts in the United States were prompt to adopt the doctrine of
contributory negligence.2 Perhaps no rule of the common law has been
more readily or more widely accepted in the United States than the
general rule of contributory negligence.' Several reasons have been
given for the early acceptance of the rule but none of them may be
considered as reliable or concrete. 4 The doctrine fitted the laissez faire
philosophy of the time and the unspoken social policy of protecting
valuable new industries, particularly the transportation industry, from
the supposedly crippling threat of large and numerous verdicts imposed
by "incurable plaintiff minded" juries.5
In North Carolina, as in all states which do not apply the doctrine of
comparative negligence, a plaintiff's negligence which occurs concur-
rently with that of the defendant will bar recovery, even though the
plaintiff's negligence was comparatively small.6 Contributory negligence
1. 11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
2. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick) 621 (1824); Washington v. Tracy, 2 D Chip
128 (Vt., 1824).
3. Annot. 32 A.L.R.3d 463 (1970).
4. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Re-
form, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135, 142 (1958) Ihereinafter cited as MALONEY].
5. Id. at 143.
6. Miller v. Miller, 237 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
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has been defined in North Carolina as conduct on the part of the
plaintiff amounting to a want of ordinary care which concurs with some
negligent act or omission of the plaintiff and is a proximate cause of the
injury complained of.' The negligence of the plaintiff does not negate
negligence of the defendant as alleged in the complaint, but presupposes
or concedes such negligence by him. 8 Contributory negligence by the
plaintiff "can exist only as a co-ordinate or counterpart" of negligence
by the defendant as alleged in the complaint.' Foreseeability and proxi-
mate cause are essential elements of contributory negligence, as well
as of negligence.1 °
As a general rule, one who has the capacity to understand and avoid a
known danger and fails to take advantage of that opportunity with re-
sulting injury is chargeable with contributory negligence." There is no
essential difference between negligence and contributory negligence,
contributory negligence being merely the negligence of the plaintiff,
who becomes defendant pro hac vice upon the issue of contributory
negligence. 12
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Moore v. Chicago Bridge and
Iron Works13 enunciated a two prong test for determining whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The following two questions must
be answered in the affirmative: Did the plaintiff fail to exercise that
degree of care which an ordinary prudent man would have exercised or
employed under the same circumstances? Was his failure to do so the
proximate cause of his injury?'14
Plaintiff's negligence, in order to bar recovery, need not be the sole
proximate cause of the injury, for this would exclude the idea of
negligence on the part of the defendant. 15 All that is necessary is that
plaintiffs negligence be one of the causes, without which the injury
would not have occurred.' 6
Over the years the courts have recognized the harshness of the rule of
7. Jackson v. McBride, 270 N.C. 367, 373, 54 S.E.2d 468, 472 (1967); Adams v.
State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958); Moore v. Chicago
Bridge & Iron Works, 183 N.C. 438, 439, 111 S.E. 776, 777 (1922).
8. Jackson v. McBride, 270 N.C. 367, 372, 154 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1970).
9. Id.
10. Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking Co., 232 N.C. 623, 625, 61 S.E.2d 904,
906 (1950).
11. Presnell v. Payne, 272 N.C. 11, 13, 157 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1967).
12. Tyson v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47 S.E.2d 251 (1948); Templeton v. Kelley, 215
N.C. 577, 581, 2 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1939); Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N.C. 378, 386, 177
S.E. 170, 176 (1935).
13. 183 N.C. 438, 111 S.E. 776 (1922).
14. Id. at 440, 111 S.E. at 778.
15. West Const. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 184 N.C. 179, 181, 113 S.E. 672,
673 (1922).
16. Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 271, 123 S.E.2d 785, 789 (1962).
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contributory negligence and have originated legal devices to alleviate
some of the injustice resulting from its application. North Carolina has
adopted the doctrines of "last clear chance" and "willful and wanton"
negligence. The legal devices are employed to place the liability back
upon the predominant tortfeasor, even though the plaintiff has been
contributorily negligent.
The doctrine of least clear chance originated in the English case of
Davies v. Mann. 7 The plaintiff negligently left his donkey fettered in
the road and the defendant drove his carriage against the animal. The
court held that the plaintiff could recover damages from the defendant,
even though both parties were negligent, because the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the animal. Thus, the doctrine of last clear
chance is applicable when both plaintiff and defendant have been
negligent and the defendant has time to avoid the injury after the
respective negligences have created the hazards.' 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court has referred to the doctrine of
last clear chance as a humane rule of law that imposes upon a person the
duty to exercise ordinary or due care to avoid injury to another who has
negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation and who he can
reasonably apprehend is unconscious thereof or is unable to avoid the
danger.' 9 The doctrine presupposes contributory negligence2" and when
the doctrine is applicable, contributory negligence does not preclude
recovery. 2
While the doctrine of last clear chance alleviates the harshness of the
rule of contributory negligence in certain cases, it has the effect of
shifting the fault of the negligence of both parties to the defendant. The
doctrine in itself is arbitrary and the reverse of the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence. The doctrine was referred to by James22 as "a way
station on the road to apportionment of damages." It has had a negative
effect on the trend in tort law of changing from a contributory negli-
gence doctrine to comparative negligence. Its application over a long
period of time has actually been "to freeze the transition rather than to
speed it."2
The other legal device used by the North Carolina courts to alleviate
17. 10 Mees &W 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
18. Mathis v. Marlow, 261 N.C. 636, 639, 135 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1964); Clodfelter
v. Carrol, 261 N.C. 630, 634, 135 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1964); Scott v. Darden, 259 N.C.
167, 171, 130 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1963); Gunter v. Winders, 256 N.C. 263, 265, 123 S.E.2d
475, 477 (1962).
19. Newbern v. Leary, 215 N.C. 134, 150, 1 S.E.2d 384, 393 (1938).
20. Mercer v. Powell, 218 N.C. 642, 648, 12 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1940).
21. Ingram v. Smokey Mountain Stages, 225 N.C. 444, 447, 35 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1945).
22. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 27 YALE L. J. 704 (1938).
23. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. Rv. 465 (1953).
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the harshness of the rule that contributory negligence completely bars
recovery is the doctrine of willful and wanton negligence. If defendants'
conduct amounts to willful and wanton negligence and is the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries, the defense of contributory negligence is not
available to the defendant.24 As pointed out by the court in Li v. Yellow
Cab Company of California,25 a comparative negligence concept should
have no application when one of the parties has been guilty of willful
and wanton conduct. This permits the courts to hold a tortfeasor whose
conduct is willful and wanton completely liable for his negligence
whether the court uses fault liability based on the doctrine of contri-
butory negligence or comparative negligence.
The concept of dividing or apportioning damages when both de-
fendant and plaintiff are at fault is being steadily adopted by the dif-
ferent jurisdictions in the United States. In 1973, the court in Hoffman
v. Jones 6 indicated that their research revealed sixteen states had
adopted by legislative act some form of comparative negligence. The
Li27 court in their March 31, 1975 decision stated that twenty-five states
had adopted some form of comparative negligence by legislative act and
that Florida, by judicial decision, had adopted comparative negligence.
As of this date twenty-five states28 have by legislative act adopted a form
of comparative negligence and two states, Florida29 and California,
30
have by judicial decision of the State Supreme Court adopted compara-
tive negligence.
There is no doubt that the state legislatures have the authority to
enact legislation changing the basis for fault liability from the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence to comparative negligence.
However, questions have been raised as to whether the judiciary has the
authority to change the common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. In Florida, where the judiciary changed to a "pure" form of
comparative negligence, the court felt it had the authority to change the
common law if the current "social and economic customs" and "mod-
em conceptions of right and justice" call for it. 1
24. Pearce v. Barnham, 271 N.C. 285, 289, 156 S.E.2d 290, 294 (1967); Blevins
v. France, 244 N.C. 334, 341, 93 S.E.2d 549, 555 (1956).
25. 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
26. 280 So.2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973).
27. 13 Cal.3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
28. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. V. ScHwARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, App. A,
367-69 (1974).
29. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
30. Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
31. 280 So.2d at 436.
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The court in Hoffman stated: "The rule that contributory negligence
as an absolute bar to recovery was-as most tort law-a judicial crea-
tion, and it was specifically judicially adopted in Florida ... ."I The
court pointed out that the doctrine of contributory negligence had been
modified by different judicial decisions such as establishing the doctrine
of last clear chance and willful and wanton conduct. It is understood
that all rules of the common law are designed for application to new
conditions and circumstances as they may develop and are intended to
be vitalized by practical applications in advanced society. 33
The court in Li, when California adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence as a defense, was faced with a different problem from that of
the Florida Court. In 1872, California had codified its doctrine of
contributory negligence enacting California Civil Code section 1714.
It was urged that any change in the law of contributory negligence must
be made by the legislature of California and not by the court, since the
legislature had codified the law of contributory negligence.
The court held in answering this contention that it was not the
intention of the legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code to
insulate the rule of contributory negligence from further judicial devel-
opment. It was the intention of the legislature to announce and formu-
late existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of
orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward contin-
uing judicial evolution.15
The acrimonious doctrine of contributory negligence in North Caroli-
na could be abolished by the state legislature or by judicial decision. At
present, the doctrine of comparative negligence is utilized by North
Carolina courts only in cases within the meaning of the Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act, 36 and subsection (C) of North Carolina General
Statute 62-242. 3 7
32. Id. at 435.
33. Id. at 436.
34. Section 1714 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
35. 13 Cal.3d at 814, 532 P.2d at 1236, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
36. 45 U.S.C. § 51. Provides as follows:
"[E]very common carrier by railroad while engaged in intrastate or interstate or
foreign commerce, shall be liable in damages to any employee for injuries 'resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence,
in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or
other equipment.'"
45 U.S.C. § 53 provides:
"In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common car-
rier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to re-
cover damages for personal injuries to an employee or where such injuries have re-
5
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The federal government through the Federal Employers Liabiilty Act
in 1908 recognized the doctrine of comparative negligence as the basis
of fault liability for the protection of railroad employees dealing in
interstate commerce. North Carolina enacted its statute for the protec-
tion of railroad employees dealing in intrastate commerce. The doctrine
is applied in North Carolina solely for the purposes of mitigating
damages or as a partial defense."'
One may ask why North Carolina, unlike so many other jurisdictions,
has not completely adopted comparative negligence. Perhaps the biggest
factor is the general inertia and resistance to change whenever substan-
tial changes in the law are proposed. Those who defend the doctrine of
contributory negligence argue that the rule is not as harsh in its practical
effect as it is in theory. 9 Advocates of the status quo tell us that the jury
handles the majority of such cases adequately now (albeit in the teeth of
the instructions they receive), so why rock the boat.40
Strong resistance against comparative negligence is also exerted by
insurance companies. The superintendent of claims of a large casualty
company and the politically powerful group he represents feels that "the
average verdict and settlement will have to be greater."'4 ' However, it
has been found in Wisconsin that the average size of verdicts have
suited in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: pro-
vided, that no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such com-
mon carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injury or death of such employee."
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-242(a) (1975) provides:
"Any servant or employee of any railroad company operating in this State who shall
suffer injury to his person or the personal representative of any such servant or em-
ployee who shall have suffered death in the course of his services or employment
with such company, by the negligence, carelessness or incompetence of any other
servant, employee or agent of the company, or by any defect in the machinery ways
or appliances of the company shall be entitled to maintain an action against such
company. Any contract or agreement, expressed or implied, made by any em-
ployee of such company to waive the benefit of this section shall be null and void.
§ 62-242(c). In all actions hereafter brought against any common carrier by
railroad to recover damages for personal injury to an employee, or where such in-
juries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be dimin-
ished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such em-
ployee: provided, however, that no such employee who may be injured or killed
shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employ-
ees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
38. Moore v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Works, 183 N.C. 438, 439, 111 S.E. 776, 777
(1922).
39. 280 So.2d at 437.
40. Maloney, supra note 4, at 160.
41. Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y. BAR.
BULL. 291, 299 (1955).
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actually decreased since that state adopted comparative negligence.4 2
Another argument frequently used is that the rule of contributory
negligence has a deterrent effect in relation to accident prevention in
that it refuses to reward negligent and reckless individuals, and that a
system of comparative negligence would allow such individuals to recov-
er damages, thereby approaching a compensation-without-fault system
where the reckless and the careful are treated alike.43 The opposite view
of this rationale is to say that the rule of contributory negligence
encourages negligence by giving the prospective defendant reason to
hope that he will avoid liability for his conduct.
Many people fear that there will be many more lengthy and complex
lawsuits. 44 This necessarily means more congestion in the courts, in-
creased legal expenses, higher insurance premiums, and longer delays
between commencement of a case and its conclusion.45 These fears have
been unfounded in several cases and there are sound reasons for believ-
ing that adoption of the comparative negligence rule would decrease
rather than increase litigation.48 Insurance companies would probably
be more apt to settle out of court if they knew the rule of contributory
negligence was not available as a defense.
Plaintiffs today may ask for a jury trial in fear that the judge will
apply the rule of contributory negligence and bar them from recovery,
because they believe that a jury will apportion damages according to the
fault of the parties regardless of the instructions given concerning contri-
butory negligence.47 Under the comparative negligence system more
cases would probably be tried before judges without a jury. This would
substantially cut down the time required for litigation.
Every trial lawyer is aware that juries often allow recovery in cases of
contributory negligence and that the case in the jury room does result in
some diminution of the damages because of the plaintiff's fault.48 But
the process is at best a haphazard and most unsatisfactory one.4 9 Dean
Maloney stated that
There is something basically wrong with a rule of law that is so con-
trary to the settled convictions of the law community that laymen will
almost always refuse to enforce it, even when solemnly told to do so
by a judge whose instructions they have sworn to follow...
42. Bress, Comparative Negligence, 43 A.B.A.J. 127, 129 (1957).
43. Haskawy, Comparative Negligence-the reflections of a skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J.
1115, 1118 (1957).
44. Levit, California Supreme Court Abolishes Contributory Negligence as a De-
fense, 627 I.L.J. 221 (April, 1975).
45. Id.
46. Maloney, supra note 4, at 162.
47. Id.
48. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1953).
49. Id.
7
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The disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a posi-
tion in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the law
is not something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill from the
mouth of lawyers, who as officers of the courts, have sworn to uphold
the law, to defend the present system by arguing that it works because
jurors can be trusted to disregard that very law.50
Intelligent instructions authorizing jurors to apportion damages in cases
involving contributory negligence would change jury cynicism and dis-
respect to respect for our courts and judicial system."'
The injustices of North Carolina's harsh contributory negligence rule
calls for legislative action. None of the usual arguments given in support
of the contributory negligence rule can override its harshness and injus-
tice. A typical statement of the objection to the barring rule was made
by Dean Green:
In Butterfield v. Forrester, the English court introduced the harshest
doctrine known to common law of the nineteenth century in the doc-
trine of contributory negligence. It is harsh because it throws the en-
tire loss on the injured party, however slight his negligent conduct,
and at the same time relieves the negligent defendant altogether, how-
ever much he may have contributed to the injury. 52
The only legal basis for the rule of contributory negligence as a bar to
recovery was the maxim "that no man shall take advantage of his own
wrong."5 It is grossly unfair that in this age the man who has sustained
injury while being only partly at fault should bear the entire financial
responsibility for the loss, while the admittedly negligent tortfeasor goes
scot-free.
There are different forms of comparative negligence in use that North
Carolina could elect to adopt. The "pure" form of comparative negli-
gence, apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases.5"
Thus, in the extreme situation under the "pure" form, a plaintiff guilty
of 99 percent of the total negligence causing his injury could recover
only one percent of the damages.55
The second basic form of comparative negligence of which there are
several variants, applies apportionment based on fault up to the point at
which the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than that of the
defendant. At that point, plaintiff is barred from recovery. Thus, a
plaintiff guilty of 49 percent of the negligence may recover 51 percent of
50. Maloney, supra note 4, at 151-52.
51. Maloney, supra note 4, at 152.
52. Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. Rnv. 36 (1950).
53. Galena and Chi. U. R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 111. 478, 491 (1858).
54. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1247,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975).
55. Id. at 827, 532 P.2d at 1247, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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the damages against the defendant responsible for 51 percent of the
negligence. If the plaintiff is guilty of 50 or more percent, he is barred
from recovery.
The principal advanced in favor of a 50 percent form of comparative
negligence is moral in nature: that it is not morally right to permit one
more at fault in an accident to recover from one less at fault.5 6 The
drawback to this form of comparative negligence is that a slight differ-
ence in the proportionate fault may permit a recovery. There has been
much justified criticism of a rule under which a plaintiff who is charged
with 49 percent of a total negligence recovers 51 percent of his dam-
ages, while one who is charged with 50 percent is barred from re-
covery.57
A third form of comparative negligence that has been used in a few
jurisdictions may be termed as "slight versus gross comparative negli-
gence." Here damages will be apportioned in situations where negli-
gence of the plaintiff is "slight" but the negligence of the defendant is
"gross" in comparison."
A majority of the legislatures that have adopted comparative negli-
gence have elected to enact the 50 percent form or one of its variants.
The two judiciaries that have adopted comparative negligence and a few
state legislatures59 have chosen the "pure" comparative negligence form.
The courts preferred the "pure" form because they considered the 50
percent form and its variants just a modified form of the rule of
contributory negligence.
CONCLUSION
The demise of the absolute-bar theory of contributory negligence has
been urged by many American scholars in the law of torts. It has been
abolished in almost every common-law nation in the world, including
England-its country of origin-and every one of the Canadian Prov-
inces. Some form of comparative negligence now exists in Austria,
France, Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, China, Japan, Poland,
Russia and Turkey.60
If the North Carolina Legislature adopts a form of comparative
negligence, the lawmakers will have time to study all the variants and to
set guidelines for the courts to follow. However, if the Supreme Court of
56. Id.
57. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REv. 1, 25 (1953).
58. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 476 (1970).
59. Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Washington have statutes adopting the "pure"
form of comparative negligence. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENcE 341, § 21.3
(1974).
60. 280 So.2d at 436.
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North Carolina adopts the doctrine of comparative negligence, the
justices will probably only apply it to the case before the court and leave
many issues unanswered. The California and Florida courts left many
issues to be resolved at the trial level in a practical manner instead of in
a theoretical manner at the appellate level.
Whether by legislation or by judicial decision, it is time for North
Carolina to abolish the antiquated doctrine of contributory negligence
and replace it with a system under which liability damages will be borne
by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respec-
tive fault. Logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice beckon
that we nullify a doctrine that automatically destroys all claims of
injured persons who have contributed to their injuries in any degree,
however slight.
JULIAN T. PIERCE
Increasing Application of Federal Securities
Laws to Real Estate Transactions
INTRODUCTION
The Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic chaos of the
1930's prompted Congress to pass corrective legislation to regulate the
securities market. To accomplish this purpose, Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act")' and the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act").2 The main thrust of the legisla-
tion was "to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to
prevent fraud in the sale thereof . . .-
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the application of the
securities law to real estate transactions. Three main areas of real estate
transactions will be examined; cooperative apartment corporations, con-
dominiums, and real estate syndications. This is not meant to be a
comprehensive examination of all areas of real estate transactions that
are subject to the federal securities laws, but rather an overview of
certain select areas.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (1971).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1971).
3. Preamble to the Securities Act of 1934, Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
10
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